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PA C S num bers: 03.65.Ta T he study ofquantum system s thatare both pre-and post-sel ected was i ni ti ated by A haronov,B ergm ann and Lebow i tz (A B L)i n 1964 [ 1] ,and hasl ed to the di scovery of m any counter-i ntui ti ve resul ts, w hi ch we refer to as pre-and post-sel ection (PPS) e ects [2] ,som e ofw hi ch have recentl y been con rm ed experi m ental l y [3] .
T hese resul ts have l ed to a l ong debate about the i nterpretati on ofthe A B L probabi l i ty rul e [ 4] . A n undercurrent i n thi s debate has been the connecti on between PPS e ects and contextual i ty. For i nstance, B ub and B row n [ 5] understood the paperofA l bert,A haronov and D ' A m ato [ 6] { w hi ch concerned a PPS e ectknow n si nce as the \3-box paradox" { as a cl ai m to a novelproofof contextual i ty, that i s, as a versi on of the B el l -K ochenSpecker theorem [ 7, 8] , and convi nci ngl y di sputed thi s cl ai m . A l though the l anguage of R ef. [ 6] does suggest such a readi ng,i n R ef. [ 9] the authors cl ari ed thei r posi ti on,stati ng thati twasnotthei ri ntenti on to concl ude anythi ng about hi dden vari abl e theori es. N onethel ess, di scussi ons ofPPS paradoxes,that i s,PPS e ects ofthe 3-box paradox vari ety,conti nueto m akeuseofa l anguage thatsuggestsi m pl i cati onsforontol ogy [ 10] and the cl ai m that certai n PPS paradoxes are proofs of contextual i ty can be found i n the l i terature [ 11] . A l though we agree w i th B ub and B row n thatthi scl ai m i sm i staken,weshow that there i s nonethel ess a cl ose connecti on between the two phenom ena.
T hi s connecti on i s expected to have i nteresti ng appl i cati ons i n quantum foundati onal studi es. For i nstance,i thasbeen suggested by som ethatB el l ' stheorem [ 12] m i ght be understood w i thi n a real i st and Lorentzi nvari ant fram ework i f one adm i ts the possi bi l i ty of a hi dden vari abl e theory that al l ow s for backward-i n-ti m e causati on [ 13] . A si m pl e m odelhas even been suggested by K ent [ 14] . T he l atter i s cl osel y connected to the fact that B el lcorrel ati ons can be si m ul ated usi ng postsel ecti on,asshow n i n B ub and B row n [ 5] . T hi ssi m ul ati on by postsel ecti on i s al so the root of the detecti on-e ci ency l oophol e i n experi m entaltests ofB el l ' s theorem [ 15, 16] . Furtheri nvesti gati onsi nto theconnecti on between proofs ofnonl ocal i ty and PPS paradoxes woul d shed new l i ght on these avenues of research. A s nonl ocal i ty i s a ki nd of contextual i ty (assum i ng separabi l i ty [ 17] ), the ubi qui tous connecti on between contextual i ty and PPS paradoxes establ i shed i n the present work i s an i m portant contri buti on to thi s project. M oreover,the fact that the phenom enon ofcontextual i ty itsel f m i ghtbe understood by abandoni ng thetradi ti onalnoti on ofcausal i ty,and the fact that i ts si m ul ati on by postsel ecti on w i l ll i kel y consti tute a l oophol e forexperi m entaltestsofcontextual i ty, m akes thi s connecti on i nteresti ng i n i ts ow n ri ght.
M erm i n [ 18] hasal ready show n oneconnecti on between PPS e ects and contextual i ty. H i s i nvesti gati on concerned w hati s know n asthe \m ean ki ng' sprobl em " [ 19] w hi ch i s a PPS e ect that i s qual i tati vel y di erent from theparadoxi calvari ety ofPPS e ectthatweshal lbeconsi deri ng. M oreover,M erm i n dem onstrated how one can obtai n a type ofm ean ki ng' s probl em that i s unsol vabl e starti ng from the m easurem ents used i n a proofofcontextual i ty,w hereas we dem onstrate how one can obtai n proofs of contextual i ty starti ng from the m easurem ents used i n a PPS paradox.
To be speci c,we dem onstrate the fol l ow i ng:forevery PPS paradox w herei n al lthe PPS probabi l i ti esare 0 or1 and thepre-and post-sel ecti on statesarenon-orthogonal , there i s an associ ated proof of contextual i ty. T he key to the proof i s that m easurem ents that are treated as tem poralsuccessors i n the PPS paradox are treated as counterfactualal ternati ves i n the proofofcontextual i ty. T hi s resul t suggests the exi stence ofa subtl e conceptual connecti on between the two phenom ena that has yet to be ful l y understood. T hus,the present work contri butes to the projectofreduci ng the num berofl ogi cal l y di sti nct quantum m ysteri esby reveal i ng the connecti onsbetween them .
W e begi n w i th a curi ous predi cti on of the A B L rul e know n as the 3-box paradox. Suppose we have a parti cl e that can be i n one ofthree boxes. W e denote the state w here the parti cl e i s i n box j by j ji. T he parti cl e i s pre-sel ected i n the state j i = j 1i+ j 2i+ j 3i and post-sel ected i n the state j i = j 1i+ j 2i j 3i (states w i l lbe l eft unnorm al i zed). A t an i nterm edi ate ti m e,one oftwo possi bl em easurem entsi sperform ed.T he rstpossi bi l i ty correspondsto the projectorval ued m easure (PV M ) [ 32] E 1 = fP 1 ;P ? 1 g;w here
T he second possi bi l i ty corresponds to the PV M E 2 = fP 2 ;P ? 2 g;w here
N ow note that P ? 1 can al so be decom posed i nto a sum of the projectors onto the vectors j 2i + j 3i and j 2i j 3i. H owever,the rstofthese i sorthogonalto the postsel ected state,w hi l e the second i s orthogonalto the presel ected state,so thatthe probabi l i ty ofthe outcom e P ? 1 occurri ng, gi ven that the pre-and post-sel ecti on were successful ,m ustbe 0. C onsequentl y,the m easurem entof E 1 necessari l y has the outcom e P 1 . Si m i l arl y,P ? 2 can be decom posed i nto a sum ofthe projectorsonto the vectors j 1i+ j 3i and j 1i j 3i,w hi ch are al so orthogonalto the post-and pre-sel ected states respecti vel y. C onsequentl y, the m easurem ent ofE 2 necessari l y has the outcom e P 2 . T hus,i fone m easures to see w hether or not the parti cl e wasi n box 1,one ndsthati twasi n box 1 w i th certai nty, and i fone m easures to see w hether or not i t was i n box 2,one nds that i t was i n box 2 w i th certai nty! T hi s i s rem i ni scent ofthe sort ofconcl usi on that one obtai ns i n proofs ofthe i m possi bi l i ty ofa noncontextual hi dden vari abl e theory. Indeed, a proof presented by C l i fton [ 20] m akes use ofthe sam e m athem ati calstructure,as we presentl y dem onstrate.
C onsi der the ei ght vectors m enti oned expl i ci tl y i n our di scussi on ofthe 3-box paradox,but i m agi ne that these descri be al ternati ve possi bl e m easurem ents at a singl e tim e (i n contrast to w hat occurs i n the 3-box paradox). In a noncontextualhi dden vari abl etheory,i ti spresum ed thatal though notal lofthesetestscan bei m pl em ented sim ul taneousl y,thei r outcom esare determ i ned by the values ofpreexi sti ng hi dden vari abl es and are i ndependent of the m anner i n w hi ch the test i s m ade (the context). T hus each of these vectors i s assi gned a val ue, 1 or 0, speci fyi ng w hether the associ ated test i s passed or not. For any orthogonalpai r,not both can recei ve the val ue 1, and for any orthogonaltri pl et, exactl y one m ust recei ve the val ue 1.R epresenti ng the vectorsby poi ntsand orthogonal i ty between vectors by a l i ne between poi nts, these ei ght vectors above can be depi cted as i n Fi g.1.
C l i fton' s proofi s an exam pl e ofa probabl istic proofof contextual i ty [ 21] ,si nce i t rel i es on assi gni ng the states j i;j i probabi l i ty 1 a priori. T hi s i s justi ed as foll ow s: the state j i can be prepared,and i fi t i s,then a subsequenttestforj iw i l lbe passed w i th certai nty,and a subsequent test for j i w i l l be passed w i th nonzero probabi l i ty (because h j i6 = 0). T hi si m pl i esthatthere m ust be som e val ues ofthe hi dden vari abl es that assi gn val ue 1 to both. C onsi der such a hi dden state. Si nce j 1i j 3iand j 2i j 3iare orthogonalto j i,they m ustbe assi gned val ue 0 for thi s hi dden state and si nce j 1i+ j 3i and j 2i+ j 3iare orthogonalto j i,they m ustal so be assi gned val ue 0. B utgi ven thatj 1i,j 2i+ j 3i,and j 2i j 3i form an orthogonaltri pl et, i t fol l ow s that j 1i m ust recei ve the val ue
To our know l edge, the connecti on between C l i fton' s proofand the 3-box paradox hasnotprevi ousl y been recogni zed. W e w i l l dem onstrate that thi s sort of connecti on i s generi c to PPS paradoxes.W e begi n w i th a shortrevi ew ofthe A B L rul e,hi dden vari abl e theori es and contextual i ty.
W e onl y consi der quantum system s w i th a ni te dim ensi onal H i l bert space and assum e that no evol uti on occursbetween m easurem ents.W e restri ctourattenti on to sharp m easurem ents, that i s, those associ ated w i th PV M s. W e al so restri ct attenti on to m easurem ents for w hi ch thestateupdatesaccordi ng to ! P j P j =Tr(P j ) upon obtai ni ng outcom e j. T hi s i s know n as the L uders rul e [ 22] . W e cal lthi s set of assum pti ons the standard fram ework for PPS e ects. It i ncl udes al l of the PPS \paradoxes" di scussed i n the l i terature to date. T he extent to w hi ch our resul ts can be general i zed beyond thi s fram ework i s a questi on for future research.
To descri bepre-and post-sel ected system s,wei m agi ne a tem poralsequence ofthree sharp m easurem ents. T he i ni ti al , i nterm edi ate, and nal m easurem ents occur at ti m est pre ,t,and t post respecti vel y,w heret pre < t< t post . T he onl y rel evant aspects ofthe i ni ti aland nalPV M s are the projectors associ ated w i th the outcom es specied by the pre-and post-sel ecti on.Letthese be denoted by pre and post respecti vel y,and l et the PV M associated w i th the i nterm edi ate m easurem ent be denoted by E = fP j g.
A ssum i ng that nothi ng i s know n about the system pri or to t pre ;so that the i ni ti aldensi ty operator i s I=d; w here I i sthe i denti ty operator,the m easurem entatt pre prepares the densi ty operator pre = pre =Tr( pre ):B y B ayes'theorem ,wecan deducethattheprobabi l i ty ofobtai ni ng the outcom e k i n the i nterm edi ate m easurem ent i s p(P k j pre ; post ;E)= Tr( post P k pre P k )) P j Tr( post P j pre P j )
:
T hi s i s a speci alcase ofthe m ost generalversi on ofthe A B L rul e [ 2] ,and we therefore referto such probabi l i ti es as\A B L probabi l i ti es".In thecasew here pre and post arerank-1 projectorsonto statesj iand j irespecti vel y, thi s rul e reduces to p(P k j ; ;E)= jh jP k j ij
w hi ch was i m pl i ci tl y used i n our di scussi on ofthe 3-box paradox.W e now revi ew hi dden vari abl e theori es. A hi dden vari abl e theory i s an attem pt to understand quantum m easurem ents as reveal i ng features of pre-exi sti ng ontic states, by w hi ch we m ean com pl ete speci cati onsofthe state ofreal i ty.A parti cul arl y naturalcl assofsuch theori esare those thatsati sfy the fol l owi ng two assum pti ons [ 17] :m easurem entnoncontextual ity, w hi ch i s the assum pti on that the m anner i n w hi ch the m easurem ent i s represented i n the H V T depends onl y on the PV M and not on any other detai l s of the m easurem ent (the context); and outcom e determ inism for sharp m easurem ents, w hi ch i s the assum pti on that the outcom e ofa PV M m easurem enti suni quel y xed by the onti c state. W e abbrevi ate these as M N H V T s. It foll ow s that i n an M N H V T ,projectors are associ ated w i th uni que pre-exi sti ng properti es that are si m pl y reveal ed by m easurem ents [ 17] .
Suppose we denote by s the proposi ti on that asserts that the property associ ated w i th projector P i s possessed. In an M N H V T the negati on of s;denoted :s; i s associ ated w i th I P: N ow consi der a projector Q that com m utes w i th P; and denote the proposi ti on associ ated w i th Q by t:In an M N H V T the conjuncti on of s and t; denoted s^t; i s associ ated w i th P Q and the di sjuncti on ofs and t;denoted s _ t;i s associ ated w i th P + Q P Q (the l atter fol l ow s from the the fact that s_ t= :(:s^:t)):
Let p(s) denote the probabi l i ty that the proposi ti on s i s true. C l assi calprobabi l i ty theory di ctates that
W e therefore obtai n the fol l ow i ng constrai ntson an M N -H V T .
A lgebraic conditions: ForprojectorsP;Q such that [ P;Q ]= 0, 0 p(P ) 1 (9) p(I P )= 1 p(P ); (10)
B y the assum pti on ofoutcom e determ i ni sm ,the probabi l i ty assi gned to every projector for a parti cul ar onti c state i s ei ther 0 or 1. T he B el l -K ochen-Specker theorem show s that there are sets ofprojectors to w hi ch no such assi gnm entconsi stentw i th the al gebrai c condi ti ons i s possi bl e.
A connecti on to PPS paradoxes i s suggested by the factthat there exi stsets ofprojectorsfor w hi ch an A B L probabi l i ty assi gnm entvi ol atesthe al gebrai cconstrai nts, w hi l e every projectorrecei vesprobabi l i ty 0 or1.W e cal l such a scenari o a l ogicalPPS paradox.T he3-box paradox i s an exam pl e ofthi s [ 33] .
N ow , if i t were the case that i n the H V T , the preand post-sel ecti on pi cked out a set of onti c states that was i ndependent ofthe nature ofthe i nterm edi ate m easurem ent,then the probabi l i ty assi gned by the A B L rul e to a projector coul d al so be i nterpreted as the probabi li ty assi gned to i t by these onti c states. B ut si nce the l atter probabi l i ti es are requi red to sati sfy the al gebrai c condi ti ons i n a M N H V T , the vi ol ati on of these conditi ons woul d be a proof of contextual i ty. H owever, the set of onti c states pi cked out by the PPS need not be i ndependent ofthe nature ofthe i nterm edi ate m easurem ent i n general . To see thi s,note that a m easurem ent i n an H V T need not be m odel l ed si m pl y by a B ayesi an updati ng of one' s i nform ati on, but m ay al so l ead to a di sturbance ofthe onti c state,and the nature ofthi sdi sturbance m ay depend on the nature ofthe i nterm edi ate m easurem ent. C onsequentl y,a PPS paradox i s not i tsel f a proofofcontextual i ty.T hi s i s di scussed i n m ore detai l i n R ef. [ 23] .
D espi te these consi derati ons,the m ai n ai m ofthi s l etter i s to show that there is a connecti on between PPS paradoxes and contextual i ty,but i t i s si gni cantl y m ore subtl e than one m i ght have thought.
T heorem . For every l ogical PPS paradox within the standard fram ework for which the pre-and post-sel ection projectors are non-orthogonal , there is an associated proof of the im possibil ity of an M N H V T that is obtained by considering allthe m easurem entsde ned by the PPS paradox { the pre-sel ection m easurem ent,the postsel ection m easurem entand the al ternative possibl e interm ediate m easurem ents { as al ternative possibl e m easurem ents ata singl e tim e.
O ur proof of thi s theorem general i zes the argum ent presented for the 3-box paradox. W e begi n w i th two l em m as and a corol l ary.
Lem m a 1. If pre , post , P are projectors satisfying post (I P ) pre = 0,then there exists a pair oforthogonalprojectors Q and R such thatI P = Q + R where pre R = 0 and post Q = 0.
Proof. LetR (I P )^(I pre ),w here P^Q denotes the projector onto the i ntersecti on ofthe subspaces associ ated w i th P and Q . T hi s cl earl y sati s es pre R = 0. M oreover,si nce R i s a subspace ofI P ,the projector Q (I P ) R i sorthogonalto R and sati s esI P = Q + R .Fi nal l y, post (I P ) pre = 0 entai l sthat post i s orthogonalto the projector onto ran((I P )ran( pre )), w here ran(X ) denotes the range ofX . B ut thi s projector i s si m pl y (I P ) (I P )^(I pre )= Q . T hus, post Q = 0 i s sati s ed.
Lem m a 2. Ifunder a pre-sel ection of pre and a postsel ection of post , the projector P receives probabil ity 1 in a m easurem entofsom e PV M E,then in an M N H V T , if pre and post are assigned probabil ity 1 by som e ontic state ,P is al so assigned probabil ity 1 by the ontic state . Succintl y,if p(P j pre ; post ;E) = 1 and p( pre j ) = p( post j )= 1,then p(P j )= 1.
Proof. Ifp(P j pre ; post ;E)= 1,then by the A B L rul e Tr( pre P post P ) Tr( pre P post P )+ Tr( pre (I P ) post (I P )) = 1 w hi ch i m pl i esthatTr( pre (I P ) post (I P ))= 0,and si nce Tr(A y A ) = 0 i m pl i es that A = 0; i t fol l ow s that post (I P ) pre = 0.Itthen fol l ow sfrom l em m a 1,that I P can be decom posed i nto a sum ofprojectorsR and Q w hi ch are orthogonalto pre and post respecti vel y. G i ven thi sorthogonal i ty,forany i n an M N H V T that yi el ds p( pre j ) = 1,and p( post j ),we have p(Q j ) = p(R j )= 0. Itthen fol l ow sfrom the al gebrai c condi ti ons that p(P j ) = 1 p(
C orollary. If p(P j pre ; post ;E) = 0 and p( pre j ) = p( post j )= 1,then p(P j )= 0.
Proof. p(P j pre ; post ;E) = 0 i m pl i es p(I P j pre ; post ;E) = 1, w hi ch by l em m a 2 i m pl i es p(I P j ) = 1. It then fol l ow s from the al gebrai c constrai nts that p(P j )= 0.
Proofoftheorem . B y the assum pti on thatthe PPS projectorsare nonorthogonal ,there exi stonti c states such that p( pre j ) = p( post j ) = 1: T hi s, together w i th l em m a 2 and i ts corol l ary,i m pl i es that w hatever probabi l i ty assi gnm ents to fP g ari se from the A B L rul e al so ari se i n any M N H V T as the probabi l i ty assi gnm ent to fP g for those onti c states yi el di ng p( pre j ) = p( post j ) = 1. Si nce, by the assum pti on of a l ogi cal PPS paradox,the A B L probabi l i ti esvi ol atethe al gebrai c condi ti ons, i t fol l ow s that the probabi l i ti es condi ti oned on thi s i n an M N H V T al so vi ol ate the al gebrai c conditi ons. H owever,probabi l i ty assi gnm ents i n an M N H V T m ust sati sfy these condi ti ons, therefore an M N H V T i s rul ed out.
A questi on that hasnotbeen addressed i n the present paper i s w hether the exi stence ofl ogi calPPS paradoxes i n a theory im pl ies m easurem ent contextual i ty. To answer thi s questi on, one m ust characteri ze each of these features i n a theory-i ndependent m anner, and exam i ne w hether every theory that exhi bi ts the form er al so exhi bi ts the l atter. For an attem pt to provi de an operati onal characteri zati on of contextual i ty, see [ 17] . N o attem pt at provi di ng an operati onalcharacteri zati on of l ogi calPPS paradoxes has yet been m ade, but i n [ 24] , K i rkpatri ck hasproposed an anal ogue ofthe 3-box paradox i n the context of a m odel w i th pl ayi ng cards [ 25] , and we have proposed a si m i l ar anal ogue i n the context ofa si m pl e parti ti oned-box m odeli n [ 23] . T hese m odel s are m easurem entnoncontextualby the de ni ti on of [17] . T husi fone agreesthatei therthe 3-box paradox ofK i rkpatri ck or that of [ 23] i s i ndeed a l ogi calPPS paradox, then one can concl ude thatl ogi calPPS paradoxesdo not i m pl y contextual i ty.
N onethel ess,the toy theory of [ 26] ,w hi ch i s i n m any respects m ore si m i l ar to quantum theory than the m odel s of [ 25] or [ 23] ,seem s unabl e to reproduce the l ogi cal PPS paradoxes. M oreover, one of the m ost conspi cuous phenom ena that thi s toy theory fai l s to reproduce i s contextual i ty (w here agai n we appealto the operati onal de ni ti on ofcontextual i ty provi ded i n [17] ). A l lofthi s suggests that there m ay be a natural set of condi ti ons that quantum theory, cl assi cal probabi l i ty theory w i th B ayesi an updati ng and the toy theory of [ 26] sati sfy,but that K i rkpatri ck' s m odeland the parti ti oned box m odel of [ 23] do not sati sfy,underw hi ch l ogi calPPS paradoxes can onl y ari se i fthere i s contextual i ty. Further i nvestigati ons i nto these i ssues are requi red. W e woul d l i ke to thank Ernesto G al vão, Terry R udol ph,and A l ex W i l ce for hel pfulcom m ents.
